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I. Introduction
A perennial problem faced by nearly all systems of law is
how to react when deeply embedded or fundamental laws be-
come unworkable or produce unfortunate results. Often, unde-
sired consequences of the law emerge as conditions in society
change. It may be instructive to look at the contrasting ways in
which two different societies, each with its own culture and sys-
tem of law, dealt with this problem in the context of criminal
law, and then to compare how the United States Supreme Court
deals with it and to see which, if either, of the two precedent
models it follows.
II. Medieval Criminal Law
Criminal trials in medieval continental Europe were heavily
influenced by the traditions of the Christian church and ancient
Roman law.' Until about the thirteenth century, the guilt or in-
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D. Brooklyn Law School; LLM
Yale Law School; J.S.D. Yale Law School.
1. J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OP PROOF 3-8 (1977); Langbein, Torture and
Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (1978); A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL
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nocence of a criminal defendant in continental Europe was com-
monly determined by ordeal, such as withstanding infection
when a hot iron was applied to the hand, or the hand was
plunged into boiling water, or floating when cast into the river.2
This practice was based upon the belief in "immanent justice,"
which assumed continuous divine intervention in the affairs of
many and, therefore, brought about certainty in criminal adjudi-
cation.3 Thus, at the climax of the criminal trial, the court would
adjourn its session, and the judges would go to church where a
solemn mass would be held. Then, an ordeal of the defendant
would be conducted by church officials, who, it was felt, would
be the appropriate persons who could invoke divine judgment.
When the Church's Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 abol-
ished ordeals in criminal trials, the entire extant system of proof
was destroyed.4 A new system was substituted, which provided
for human, instead of divine, judgment. In order to prevent
human error and to achieve certainty in adjudication, the new
system was designed to keep out human discretion from the de-
termination of guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.5 In-
stead, objective and certain proof was required by the testimony
of two eyewitnesses to the crime.6 According to the medieval
viewpoint which was shaped by well-entrenched traditions
rooted in Christian perspectives, Roman law, the Bible and
other cultural influences, such testimony was believed to provide
the requisite certainty.7 There could be no conviction without
such testimony because that would have required a subjective
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 10-11, 78-79, 96 (J. Simpson trans. 1913); E. PETERS, TORTURE 49,
65, 67, 69 (1985); E. PETERS, INQUIsITION (1989). The work and conclusions of a number
of scholars, principally Esmein, Langbein and Peters, have been relied on heavily herein,
particularly for medieval sources in Latin and Italian cited hereafter.
. 2. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 6; ESMEIN, supra
note 1, at 7ff.
3. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 43.
4. LANGBREIN, TORTURE AND TiE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 6; P. FIoRELLI, LA
TORTURA GIUDIZIARIA NEL Dmrrro CoMuNE 8 (1953); Van Caenegem, The Law of Evi-
dence in the Twelfth Century: European Perspectives and Intellectual Background,
PROC. SECOND INT'L CONGRESS MEDIEVAL CANON L. 297 (1965); Baldwin, The Intellectual
Preparation for the Canons of 1215 Against Ordeals, 36 SPECULUM 613 (1961); ESMEIN,
supra note 1, at 57-58.
5. LANGERIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 4.
6. Id. at 6, 7.
7. FIORELLI, supra note 4, at 38. Many court officials had ecclesiastical training.
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decision by a judge as to whether or not the circumstantial evi-
dence proved guilt.' Subjective judgment by humans was felt to
be error-prone."
Judicial procedure in criminal trials was henceforth. to be
governed by three fundamental rules.'0 First, no court could
convict and condemn an accused unless there were two eyewit-
nesses to the gravamen of the crime." Second, a court could
convict on the basis of a voluntary confession. 12 Third, circum-
stantial evidence, no matter how compelling, was inadequate.13
For example, a suspect seen running away from a murdered
man's house, who was later found to possess the bloody dagger
and stolen loot, could not be convicted on the basis of this evi-
dence alone.1"
It soon became apparent to medieval decision makers that
the new system had set the standard of proof at too high a level.
The system could be effective only for those who committed
crimes in full view of eyewitnesses, or for criminals who re-
pented and confessed their crimes. It was not suited for the
cold-blooded or deliberate criminal, whom it was simply impos-
8. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Id.
10. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 4. Some anteced-
ents of the first and third rules may be traced to Jewish and Biblical Laws, while the
second is contrary to Jewish Law, as indicated hereafter.
11. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 19:15.
12. In Jewish Law, however, all confessions were completely disregarded even if they
were undeniably voluntary. For a further discussion of this point, see infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
13. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 4.
14. LANOBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 4; FioRELi, supra
note 4, at 1, 105 Vol. 1 (1953); PmTES, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 47. The Talmud, which
contains the Jewish Law tradition has a similar example. Rabbi Simeon ben Shetah said:
May I never see comfort if I did not see a man pursuing his fellow into a ruin, and
when I ran after him and saw him, sword in hand with blood dripping from it, and
the murdered man writhing, I exclaimed to him: Wicked man, who slew this man?
It is either you or I! But what can I do, since thy blood (i.e., life) does not rest in
my hands, for it is written in the Torah, by the mouth of two witnesses ... shall
he that is to die be put to death? [Therefore, he could not be executed since there
were not two eyewitnesses to the murder.] May He Who Knows One's Thoughts
exact vengeance from him who slew his fellow!
SANHEDRIN, BABYLONIAN TALMUD, ch. 4, p. 376 (J. Schacter trans. 1969). In certain cases,
however, circumstantial evidence and inferences could be used in Jewish Law. See infra
note 74 and accompanying text.
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sible to convict.15 In the interests of justice and the maintenance
of public order, it was felt to be crucial to convict and punish
criminals. European jurists, therefore, gradually developed a
strategy to overcome the difficulty of convicting under the new
system of proof.
The new strategy was made feasible by a coalescence of fac-
tors. One was the spread of the inquisitorial system of trial, in
lieu of the accusatorial system that had prevailed in Western
Europe.16 Under the accusatorial system, trials were initiated by
accusations brought by private parties, trials were public and by
peers, and the judge acted as a neutral arbiter. 7 An accused
could exculpate himself by either oath or ordeal.1 8 This system is
in contrast to the inquisitorial system, whose "two predominant
features are, the secret inquiry to discover the culprit, and the
employment of torture to obtain his confession."1 9 This system
entailed intense and detailed investigation by a magistrate who
controlled the entire trial procedure.20 "There is the atmosphere
of secrecy and consequently of suspicion, in the midst of which
the trial proceeds .... 2
A change from an accusatorial to an inquisitorial system oc-
curred in Roman law during the first century B.C.2 Thereafter,
in Europe, "the Church was the first authority which changed
from the accusatory to the inquisitorial procedure. ' 23 Moreover,
"[tihe Church was able to furnish secular courts with a lesson
and a model, in the methods of its ecclesiastical tribunals. By its
example, it paved the way for the substitution, consummated in
the 1500s, of the inquisitorial procedure for the accusatory pro-
cedure in every country of Europe.
'
"
2 4
Moreover, confession was regarded as the regina
probatorium (the queen of proofs) and as standing at the very
15. For an explication of how this problem was handled in Jewish Law, see infra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
16. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 40.
17. EsmsiM, supra note 1, at 7.
18. Id.; see also PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 42.
19. ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 8; PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 51, 69.
20. PETERS, INQUISrITON, supra note 1, at 12.
21. EsMEIN, supra note 1, at 11.
22. PETERS, INQUISIlION, supra note 1, at 2, 11.
23. EsMEIN, supra note 1, at 78; PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 51, 67.
24. EsMEIN, supra note 1, at 10; see also, PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 41, 67.
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apex of the hierarchy of proofs required for the conviction of the
criminal defendant.25 In significant part, this was due to Church
teachings.26 Sacramental confessions were made an annual obli-
gation by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.27 "[T]he role of
confession became central to many areas of twelfth-century life.
It was not long before it became central in serious criminal cases
as well."'28
The thirteenth century revolution in the law of proof and
the central value placed on confessions as the queen of proofs,
resulted in convictions of criminal defendants becoming abso-
lutely dependent on coerced confessions.29 These in turn had be-
come an integral part of the inquisitorial system of trials. 30 The
strategy now employed to obtain confessions and convictions "at
any cost" 31 in the interests of justice and public order was
uniquely suited to the inquisitorial system.32 It entailed tortur-
ing a criminal defendant until he confessed, albeit under certain
safeguards.3 3 The court would then treat the confession as
though it was voluntary and, therefore, acceptable under the
new system. 4 Because of the elevated status of confessions in
the medieval hierarchy of proofs, the defendant could now be
convicted. 5 Gradually, an intricate and detailed Law of Torture
developed in continental criminal procedures. 6
The system of judicial torture spread through Europe. It
was still current everywhere in most of Europe five hundred
years later, well into the eighteenth century, and in some areas,
25. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 41, 44.
26. Id. at 46, 49, 67, 69.
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id. at 46. Peters also states, "[ilt was impossible to use Roman-Canonical.proce-
dure without using torture with it." Id. at 69; see also id. at 51.
29. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 72.
30. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 51, 69.
31. ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 676; LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra
note 1, at 3.
32. R. VAN CAENEGEM, LA PREUVE, XIX RECUSILS DE LA SOCIErE JEAN BODIN POUR
L'HIsTOIRE COMPARATVE DES INSTITUrIONs 740 (1963); PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at
51.
33. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
34. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 41.
35. Id.
36. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 8; PETERS, TOR-
TURE, supra note 1, at 44.
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into the nineteenth century.3 7 Numerous legal treatises were
written on the Law of Torture, and torture was routinely applied
under judicial approval and supervision."8 "Torture was part of
the ordinary criminal procedure, regularly employed to investi-
gate and prosecute routine crime for the ordinary courts."3
This system of judicial torture entailed the use of physical
coercion by officers of the state in order to gather evidence for
judicial proceedings in cases of serious crime punishable by
death or severe physical maiming.40 This system should be dis-
tinguished from torture used as a sanction or mode of punish-
ment for those already convicted.' 1
The use of torture in judicial proceedings was not a new in-
novation in Medieval Europe, but was well established in the
cultural traditions of Europe. In ancient Greece, torture was ap-
plied as a judicial tool, mainly against slave witnesses to have
them verify under torture the testimony that they had previ-
ously given.'2 Demosthenes claimed that it had never been
known to fail.'3
Torture was also used in imperial Rome, and the Digest
contains many references to the use of torture in Roman law."
During the first century, the Romans in Palestine used judicial
torture as a standard tool in criminal law proceedings to elicit
confessions from the accused, and widely applied it against
Jews.'8 Judicial torture was also employed by many Germanic
37. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 3.
38. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 3; Langbein, Tor-
ture and Plea Bargaining, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
39. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 3; see also ESMEIN,
supra note 1, at 9.
40. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 4.
41. Id. at 3.
42. 2 R. BONNER & G. SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARIS-
TOTLE 126-30, 223-31 (1938); see ARISTOTLE, RHzToftc, ch. 15. The practice of torture in
criminal trials is also mentioned in AmsToPHENES, THE FROGS 44-45 (R. Lattimore trans.
1962). See PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 14-15; see generally 1 R. BONNER & G.
SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOME TO ARISTOTLE (1930); R. BONNER,
EVIDENCE IN ATHENIAN COURTS (1905).
43. DEMOSTHENES 23-37 (J. H. Vince trans. 1935).
44. See DIG. 48.18; THEODOSIAN CODE at 9.40.1 (C. Pharr. trans. 1952); CODE J.
9.41.8, 9.47.16; LANGEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 8; PETERS,
TORTURE, supra note 1, at 18, 21, 33.
45. Lieberman, Roman Legal Institutions in Early Rabbinics and the Acta
Martyrom, 35 JEWISH Q. REV. 1,15 (1944).
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tribes."'
The Church, too, adopted the use of torture:
[T]he ancient ecclesiastical Fathers who lived in the days of the
Roman Empire ... spoke of torture which they saw in practice
every day in a civilized country as if it were a natural and normal
thing. Johannes Teutonicus who compiled the glossary to Gra-
tian's "Decretum" also approves of torture in his "teaching" and
he adopts all the applications made of it by the Roman laws.
The great doctors of the 1200s including Pope Innocent IV
and Durantis, entertained no doubts as to the legality of this
method of examination. Certain formal texts also admitted it. In
the "inquisito haereticae pravitatis" the legislation was particu-
larly precise."
After the mid-thirteenth century, torture had a secure place
in ecclesiastical procedure which had a crucial influence on lay
criminal procedures. 4 This is reflected in a decretal of Pope In-
nocent IV in 1252 which confirmed the use of torture in canon
procedure.49 Moreover, one of the rationales for the use of tor-
ture was that "God will give the innocent the strength to resist
the pain" 50 and that if one were tortured three times and still
did not confess, "it will be evident that God performed miracles
for him. '51
To be sure, the law purported to place limits on the use of
torture, and the torture was surrounded by numerous procedural
safeguards. For example, torture was only to be used if there was
probable cause to believe that the defendant was, in fact,guilty.52 This could occur, for example, if there was a "half-
proof" of guilt, such as one eyewitness, or cogent circumstantial
46. ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 108.
47. ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 91.
48. PETERS, ToRTURE, supra note 1, at 49, 65, 67.
49. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 7; see FIORELLI,
supra note 4, at 131; R. VAN CAENEGEM, La Preuve dans le Droit du Moyen Age Occi-
dental, in RECUEILLS DE LA SOCIETE JEAN BODIN PouR L'HIsToIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTI-
TUTIONS 691, 735-39 (xxxx); ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 79 (1913); C. LEA, THE INQUISrION
OF THE MIDDLE AGES, ITS ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION 175 (1963).
50. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 147 n.12; J. GIls-
SEN, La Preuve en Europe du XVI au Debut du XIX Siecle, in 17 REcUEILLS DE LA
SoCIETE JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATrVE DES INSTITUTIONS 755, 788.
51. ESMEIN, supra note 1, at 113 n.5 (quoting Bourdot de Richeborg IV, 1, p. 214).
52. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 5.
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evidence, for example, possession of the bloody dagger and loot,
each of which was regarded as constituting one-quarter proof.
The utilization of the "probable cause" doctrine, however, per-
mitted circumvention of the prohibition against the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence."3 According to the ingenuity of medieval
jurists, if there was probable cause to believe in the suspect's
guilt, circumstantial evidence could be used to produce a deci-
sion to torture the suspect, even though it could not be used to
convict.5 4
Another purported safeguard was that under the inquisito-
rial system of trials, the investigating magistrate had the respon-
sibility to supervise the administration of the trial, and could
not delegate this function. Accordingly, the magistrate himself
conducted the interrogation under torture in the presence of two
or more observers, and a clerk who transcribed the proceedings
in an official record.5 5 Additionally, "vast legal treatises" were
compiled to determine when there was sufficient probable cause
to torture and to minutely regulate procedure and establish and
refine principles of law.56 The foregoing procedural protection
for the criminal defendant brings to mind Grant Gilmore's quip,
"[]n Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
meticulously observed. '5 7
As an additional safeguard, confession under torture was of-
ficially treated as involuntary and, therefore, ineffective unless it
was repeated later by the defendant at a hearing. The rub, how-
ever, was that:
[O]ften enough the accused who had confessed under torture did
recant when asked to confirm his confession. But seldom to avail:
the examination under torture could thereupon be repeated. An
accused who confessed under torture, recanted, and then found
53. Id. at 5-7.
54. Id. at 14; Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, supra note 1, at 5.
55. CONSMUrIO CRIMINALIS CAROLINA Article 46 (1532); FIoRELLi, supra note 4, at
60-62; JoosT DAMHOUDER, PRACTIQUE JUDICIAIRE RN CAUSES CRIMINELLES (1564);
LANGRIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 14.
56. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 5; PETERS, TOR-
TURE, supra note 1, at 72. As Peters put it, "[o]nly the widespread, although often indi-
rect influence of the Romano-Canonical procedure can explain the large amount of legis-
lation and jurisprudence devoted to the problem of torture in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries." PETmS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 70.
57. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
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himself tortured anew, learned quickly enough that only a "vol-
untary" confession and the ratification hearing would save him
from further agony in the torture chamber.58
Furthermore, in theory, torture was to be used to elicit facts
which, in the words of a German statute of 1532, "no innocent
person can know." 9 Torture was not to be used to elicit a con-
fession. The facts which the tortured defendant brought forth
were required to be investigated and verified.
In the real world, however, these protective procedural de-
vices did not always work. In the words of a sixteenth century
commentator, under torture, defendants might break down
under "the pain and torment" and "confess things that they
never did." 60 The examining magistrate might accidentally, or
unknowingly, ask suggestive questions and elicit a confession
rather than simply verify facts. It was also not infrequent for an
innocent defendant to know something about a crime, and that
fact given under torture would corroborate his commission of
the crime and prove his guilt. 1 Unfortunately, too, the proce-
dural rules were not always enforced, or were not scrupulously
enforced, to require verification of confessions.2
Although the drawbacks and inhumanity of torture were
pointed out by many during the Middle Ages, this was done only
to suggest improvements in the system. Rarely, and only excep-
tionally, was the abolition of torture itself recommended. 3 The
system of torture nevertheless survived for five hundred years,
ending only a little more than two centuries ago.6 4 In some parts
of Europe, it continued until the nineteenth century.6 5 European
jurists and European society in general, evaded their own re-
quirements of justice by subterfuge and circumvention of both
the letter and spirit of the law in the interests of "justice."
58. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 15-16.
59. Id. at 5; Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, supra note 55, Art. 54.
60. See LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 9; DAMHOUDER,
supra note 55, ch. 39 at 44.
61. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 9.
62. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 16; DAMHOUDER,
supra note 55, ch. 35 at 8.
63. PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 72.
64. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF, supra note 1, at 18.
65. Id. at 3.
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Through some psychological mechanism, they went further
and deluded themselves into believing that they were carefully
following the law, and prided themselves on their scrupulous ob-
servance of the law. One should not accuse the medieval jurists
of hypocrisy. They merely utilized a mental process long before
pinpointed in antiquity in the Bible."' The jurists simply closed
their eyes to what was really happening, and made themselves
oblivious to the cruelty and the base inhumanity of inflicting
torture and the agony on the tormented.
An alternative explanation is the suspension of critical
thinking, called by some, a "sleep of reason. "67
In an era when all philosophy derived from Aristotle, astronomy
from Ptolemy, medicine from Hippocrates and Galen, and the law
was contained in those texts of Roman wisdom preserved in Jus-
tinian's compilation, to argue against torture, which the texts
sanctioned, would have meant (unheard of temerity!) to under-
mine the common foundations of respect, of indisputable author-
ity, of the thing speaking for itself, self-evident, upon which regu-
lated itself in that epoch the entire ordering, not only of the laws,
nor only of human wisdom, but of an entire human social
structure.68
While the modern mind is appalled at such practices, one
should not be surprised. The attitudes and practices of judges
and other law personnel regarding physical brutality reflected
those of the general population. After all, the onset of the prac-
tice of routine judicial torture took place during the era of the
Crusades. From 1063 on, crusaders through nearly all of Europe
attacked hundreds of Jewish communities, massacred thousands
of Jews and forcibly converted others.6 At other times, entire
66. Isaiah 6:10
You hear, but refuse to understand. You see, but refuse to perceive. Therefore,
stuff up the heart of the people and make its ears heavy and seal its eyes, lest it
see with its eyes and hear with its ears and its heart would understand and it
would repent and be healed.
67. This is the title of one of Lucientes de Goya's caprichos. He noted "when reason
sleeps, it produces monsters." See PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 75-76.
68. FIORELLI, supra note 4, at 218; PETERS, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 81.
69. See e.g., H. GRAETZ, HISTORY OF THE JEWS (1941); A. HABERMAN, SEFER GEZEROT
ASHKENAZ VE'ZAREFAT (1946); S. RUNCIMAN, HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES (1951-55); S.
SALFELD, DA6 MARTYROLOGIUM DES NURENBERGER RAKHAMIN (1898). Most Jews in Eu-
rope, however, chose to be killed rather than to relinquish their faith, and often commit-
[Vol. 11:535
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Jewish communities (and sometimes, all Jews in the entire coun-
try), were forcibly expelled from France, England, parts of Ger-
many and Italy, and later from Portugal and Spain. Similarly,
horrible massacres occurred of Christian communities that re-
fused to follow the beliefs and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church during the Albigensian Crusades. 70
The behavior of the medieval jurists and the society which
tolerated torturing criminal defendants helped to set the stage
for the cruelties later practiced by the Church Inquisition in the
Middle Ages in which unspeakable tortures were inflicted upon
its victims by those who uttered sanctimonious pronouncements
about mercy and kindness. 71
In sum, medieval jurists resolved the problem of unsatisfac-
tory fundamental law which prevented conviction, by purporting
to observe the law carefully but, in fact, circumventing it by use
of torture, while cultivating self-inflicted blindness to the reali-
ties involved and the unfairness and cruelties of the process.
III. Jewish Law
In the thirteenth century, Jewish jurists in Western Europe
came face-to-face with the identical situation that induced their
non-Jewish colleagues to introduce the routine practice of tor-
ture in criminal law procedure. Defendants could not be con-
victed if traditional Jewish law was applied. Jewish law was even
more strict than Church law, and made it nearly impossible to
convict criminal defendants.7 2 Two eyewitnesses were required,
and the use of circumstantial evidence was severely downgraded,
ted suicide en masse, sometimes by killing each other, instead of waiting to be tortured
and killed by crusading mobs.
70. RuNcIMAN, supra note 69, at 25.
71. C. LEA, supra note 49; C. VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CorrINENTAL CmMmAL LAW
180 (1916). For an exploration of the stark contrasts that sometimes exist between how
the law actually operates in practice, as distinct from mythical claims of how it purports
to operate, see Reisman, Myths Systems and Operational Codes in FOLDED Lims 1
(1979).
There may be relevant in this context the notion of legal fictions, law statements
whose patent falseness (called by some "white lies" or "swindling") is never exposed
because of generally accepted convention. See FULLER, LEGAL FICTION ix, 5 (1967);
MAINE, ANcIENT LAW 25 (1963); POUND, INTERP-rATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 4 (1923).
72. As indicated above, Jewish and Biblical Law were among the sources for the
similar Medieval Law doctrine. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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if not made useless. 7 s In addition, Jewish law went much further
in casting a protective net around criminal defendants. Unlike
the Roman and Canon law traditions, confessions were abso-
lutely disregarded, even where there was no question that they
were voluntary. 4 Moreover, a defendant could not be convicted
unless immediately before the commission of the crime, he was
warned in the presence of two persons that if he committed the
crime he would be punished. 75 Additionally, the precise penalty
had to be stated to him.76 Still more, the defendant had to ac-
knowledge the forewarning by stating, "I know the crime and
the penalty, but I will do it nevertheless."'77 It was not sufficient
for him to merely nod his head or even to say, "I know it."'78
These and other technical rules made it nearly impossible to
convict a cold-blooded or deliberate clandestine murderer, thief,
or assaulter. If he were forewarned, and was thus alerted to the
presence of witnesses, he could simply wait and commit the
crime at a time or place when there were no witnesses. These
requirements were such that convictions were generally possible
only for those who committed crimes of passion or for revenge
and did not care that they might be observed and executed. 9
During the existence of the Jewish Commonwealth (until
approximately the year seventy) there apparently existed a dual
authority system, with two parallel, but distinct, juridical orga-
nizations that dealt with those accused of crimes. These bodies
were the religious courts and secular royal officials. Where a
Jewish court, which applied traditional Jewish law, could not or
would not convict a criminal defendant, the king or other secular
authorities could execute or inflict severe physical sanctions
without recourse to traditional Jewish law.80 Where the secular
73. See Deuteronomy 19:15; TALMuD, B. Sanhedrin 37b; A. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW
AND DECISION-MAKING 277, 394 (1979). For a detailed discussion, see E. HENKIN, Pirushei
Ivra 17, 20, reprinted in E. HINKN, Kitvei Hagria (1981).
74. TALMUD, B. Sanhedrin 9b; RAMBAM, YAD HA'KHAZAKA, Laws of the Sanhedrin,
18:6.
75. B. TALMUD, Makkot, 6b, Sanhedrin 8b, 40b, 41a, SOb.
76. RAMEAM, YAD HA'KHAZAK, Laws of the Sanhedrin, chap. 12:2.
77. SCHREIBER, supra note 73, at 269.
78. Id.
79. See generally id. at 277-78.
80. See RAMBAm, YAD HA'K ZAKA, Laws concerning a Murderer and the Preserva-
tion of Life 2:4; N. Gerundi, Derashot Ha'Ran, Discourse No. 11; Y. Abarbanel, Corn-
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officials did not act, even the Jewish religious courts were em-
powered to execute or sanction one who was obviously a crimi-
nal, although the application of traditional Jewish law would
have prevented conviction."1
With the destruction of the Jewish Commonwealth by the
Romans and the dispersion of Jews from Israel throughout the
world, Jews lost the power to inflict execution or serious physical
sanctions even where they were permitted to govern themselves
for other limited purposes, such as taxation.82
In the thirteenth century, however, there were occasions,
particularly in Spain, where the king gave Jewish communities
the power to pass a sentence of execution upon a criminal.8 s The
execution would generally be carried out by royal officials.8 " It
was at this point that Jewish law jurists came up against the
problem of how to maintain public order when Jewish law made
it nearly impossible to convict.
The focus of the Jewish public order problem concerned in-
formers."8 They would report the alleged violations of laws by
Jews to local non-Jewish authorities. Their reports were often
avidly listened to by the various local rulers of petty principali-
ties, as is true of informers in police states in the contemporary
world today. Those who were reported might be imprisoned, tor-
tured or made to suffer otherwise.86 The activities of the inform-
ers caused havoc in Jewish communities which were often sub-
jected en masse to onerous penalties, including enormous fines,
and even expulsion. As described by a historian regarding the
Jewish community in medieval Spain:
mentary to Deuteronomy 17:18, and to Judges 17, and 18:7; I. Horowitz, Shnei Luhot
Ha'Brit, reprinted Jerusalem, 1972, vol. 3 at 186-87; Y. Loewe, B'er Ha'Gola, ch. 2; Y.
Gershuni, Kol Tzofayikh, at 92 (1980) and his Khok U'Mishpat, at 9-15 (1988). For
additional discussion and citations, see SCHREIBER, supra note 73, at 245-49, 258.
81. RAMEBA, supra note 80, at 2:4. Trials before the court using traditional religious
law appear to have had as a main purpose, the expiation or atonement of the criminal
and the community for the offenses of the defendant, rather than the maintenance of
public order and safety. See SCHRMER, supra note 73, at 276-78.
82. See SCHREMER, supra note 73, at 292, 312.
83. Id. at 402, 405.
84. Id. at 405.
85. Id. at 383.
86. A. NEuMAN, THE JEWS IN SPAIN (1948); Kaufman, The Jewish Informers in the
Middle Ages, 8 JEWISH Q. REv. 221 (1895).
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[t]he most dangerous criminal in the Spanish Juderia was the in-
former, or Malasin. He was despised as a traitor and dreaded as
an enemy of society. The hatred which he inspired can be ex-
plained only by the panicky state of mind of a community which
lived in constant dread of lurking danger . . . no one was too
highly placed to be beyond his poisoned fangs. Men of leading
importance in their communities - Jewish bailiffs, court physi-
cians, diplomats and ministers of finance; distinguished rabbis
who are universally beloved and revered, like Alfasi, Nissim
Gerundi, Barfat, and Hasdai Crescas - were the targets of ven-
omous denunciations. They were thrown into prison, their lives
were in grave danger and, with their fate, the existence of their
communities was at stake . . .87
Murderers, thieves, and other offenders were also, although to a
lesser extent, a public order concern of Jewish communities.88
But, how could public order be maintained in view of the
doctrines of Jewish law which made it nearly impossible to con-
vict deliberate and clandestine offenders? The issue was
squarely faced and resolved by the Jewish jurists. Rabbi Shlomo
ben Aderet (known by the acronym Rashba, 1235-1310) one of
the outstanding Jewish jurists and religious leaders of that time,
stated the matter quite candidly. "If ... you establish every-
thing in accordance with the laws of the Torah [traditional Jew-
ish law], -according to the laws of the Sanhedrin [the chief Jew-
ish court], the world would be desolate, because murderers and
their associates would multiply . . .,89 or, as he recorded in an-
other responsum, "for should you establish everything according
to the laws of the Torah, and act only in accordance with how
the Torah punished, . . . the result would be that world society
would perish, for we would need witnesses and forewarning ....
The result would be that the world would be desolate... ."90 He
accordingly ruled that many of the traditional requirements of
Jewish law need not be applied. The decision and Rabbi
Shlomo's approach were assented to by Rabbi Baruch ben Meir
87. NEuMA, supra note 86, at 130, 132.
88. See, e.g. Yehudah ben Asher, Responsa, Zikhron Yehuda, No. 58; Yitzchok ben
Sheshet, Responsa, Rivaph, No. 234-6.
89. ScHRmnER, supra note 73, at 380-83 (Trans. of a Responsum of Rabbi Shlomo
ben Aderet, published by Kaufman in 8 JwisH Q. Rzv. 228 (1895)).
90. Responsa Rashba vol. III, No. 393; see also vol. IV, No. 311.
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of Rothenberg, an older contemporary of Rabbi Shlomo, an in-
fluential Jewish law scholar and, perhaps, the most renowned re-
ligious leader in Germany and France."1 This decision was cited
with approval by the authoritative codifier of the Jewish Code of
laws, Rabbi Yosef Karo, and was widely accepted as binding in
Jewish law."'
In sum, medieval Jewish law decision makers squarely faced
the problem of a traditional fundamental law that was unsatis-
factory in that it would not bring about desired results under
the changed circumstances in which they found themselves.
They thereupon candidly and openly decided to suspend appli-
cation of traditional Jewish law doctrines. In fact, they turned
traditional law on its head and abolished fundamental principles
which required two eyewitnesses, forewarning, and numerous
other provisions of law." They found ample precedent and legal
doctrine in Jewish law for this radical step.9 " These precedents
and doctrines made Jewish law flexible enough to be applied
under the changed circumstances in which they found them-
selves, and, also to be able to achieve the desired ends."' Unlike
their contemporary non-Jewish jurists, medieval Jewish jurists
resisted the temptation to resort to torture in order to convict
criminal defendants. Torture would have violated basic dogmas
and traditions in Biblical and Jewish law. These had constantly
called for the reduction of corporal punishment and sufferings
91. SCHREIBER, supra note 73, at 383.
92. Yosef Karo, Commentary Beth Yosef to Jacob ben Asher's Tur, Hoshen
Mishpat, Laws Concerning Judges, Section 2. Karo also cites him in Section 388:8. For
similar holdings see also Responsa Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman (known as Ramban,
1194-1270), No. 240, and 279; and Responsa Rashba, 1:612, 3:109; Y. Anatoli, Malemed
Ha'Talmidim, pp. 71-72, Berlin, 1866; Y. M. Ginsberg, Mishpatim Le'Yisrael; p. 55
(1956); Mann, "Skirah Historit at Dine Nefashot Bazran Hazeh", Hatzofeh
le'Hakhmat Yisrael 10:200, and in Jewish Quarterly Review, N. S. 10:120-130, 1920.
93. See supra notes 75-76 and Responsa of Rabbi Yehudah Ben Asher in Zikhron
Yehudah, No. 58 (1946, 1968; Shlomo Luria, Yam Shel Shlomo, B.K; 8:6; Yitzkhok Ben
Sheshet, Responsa Rivash, Sec. 251; Meir of Lublin, Responsa Maharam Lublin, Sec.
138; (author unknown), Kalbo, Sec. 116; R. Yerukham, Mesharim, Sec. 2, No. 51; Y.
Ginzberg, Mishpatim Le'Yisrael, 55 ff. (1956).
94. SCHREMER, supra note 73, at 234-35, 397-405.
95. These precedential doctrines included the authority to temporarily suspend laws
in an emergency, and to view public order laws of non-Jewish states as binding upon
Jews. Thus, these doctrines overrode otherwise applicable Biblical Law in addition to
other principles which Jewish jurists were able to utilize to deal with the new circum-
stances in which they found themselves. See SCHWEBR, supra note 73, at 234-35.
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and created a remarkable protective net around criminal
defendants."
Moreover, unlike the medieval and Canon law tradition
where confession was the "queen of proofs," the use of confes-
sions at trials in Jewish law was absolutely barred, whether or
not voluntary. 7 Additionally, while confession of sins by man to
his Maker is mandated as a penance in the Jewish religious tra-
dition, confession to another person, or even confession in a loud
voice so that another can hear, is prohibited to avoid embarrass-
ment to the confessor or invasion of his privacy.9 8 Also, Jews had
long suffered horribly from the judicial tortures inflicted on
them by the Roman judges in Palestine, and recoiled from its
use.
99
In sum, Jewish law decision makers and religious authorities
in medieval Western Europe adopted an opposite tack from that
adopted by the jurists who followed the Roman or Canon law
traditions. Instead of purporting to retain traditional, but unsat-
isfactory fundamental laws while circumventing them in prac-
tice, Jewish law jurists took a very different path. They openly
suspended the application of traditional Jewish law in order to
be able to convict criminals and maintain public order but re-
96. Id. at 399.
97. TALMUD, B. SANHEDRIN 9b; RAMBAM, LAWS OF THE SANHEDRIN 18:6; A. KIRSCHEN-
BAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW (1970).
98. TALMUD, Yoma, 21; Rashi ad Loc; Sotah 32b; Yoma 86b; Shulkhan Arukh, O.H.
§ 607(2).
99. Coercing confessions by whipping is mentioned in the Talmud (Baba Batra,
167a, Baba Meziah 24a, Moed Katan 16a), and in a few medieval Jewish Law decisions,
(see e.g., Shimon Ben Tzemakh Duran, Responsa Tashbatz, Sec. 2, No. 224, and Sec. 3,
No. 168; responsum of Asher Ben Yekhiel included in Yehudah Ben Asher's Zikhron
Yehudah at p. 53; Responsa Rosh, Sec. 68:21; Shlomo Ben Aderet, Responsa Rashba,
Sec. 1, No. 1210; Yitzkhak Ben Sheshet, Responsa Rivash, No. 484; Shmuel D. Medine,
Responsa Mahrashdam H.M. No. 360; Avraham HaevI, Responsa Ginat Veradim, Sec.
3:9; Yaakov Ben Asher, Tur H.M. Sec. 42. A computerized search of more than 50,000
Jewish Law responsa, however, covering the last millennium has uncovered only the
aforementioned handful of decisions which mention this practice. Because of the paucity
of adequate information, one can only guess as to whether such whipping was practiced
only sporadically or frequently, under what circumstances, where, and when. It seems
clear, however, that Jewish judges and decision makers did not apply the gruesome tor-
tures which were routinely inflicted by their non-Jewish counterparts.
For the legal validity of coerced acts (other than confessions) in areas such as com-
merce, marriage, divorce or in sacerdotal matters, see B. TALMUD, Baba Kama 62a, Baba
Batra 48b, Rosh Ha'shana 6a, 28a, Yebamot 106a, Kiddushin 50a, Erukhin 21a.
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sisted the temptation to introduce torture.
IV. The Exclusionary Rule in the United States
The exclusionary rule, which bars the use at trial of illegally
obtained evidence or confessions, originated more than one hun-
dred years ago. In Boyd v. United States,100 the United States
Supreme Court concluded that admitting into evidence papers
that had been acquired through an illegal search and seizure
constituted a violation of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, which guarantees against compulsory self-
incrimination.'0 1 Nearly thirty years later, in Weeks v. United
States,'0' the Court unanimously reversed the conviction of a
gambler because papers, which had been illegally seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, had been admitted into evi-
dence. 103 Again, only a few years later, in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States,04 the Supreme Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Holmes, held that "[t]he essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way" is that
"not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all" and that this rule is
"constitutionally required."'105 Just one year later, in Gouled v.
United States,0 6 the Supreme Court once more reiterated its
view and effectively overruled an earlier case, Adams v. New
York.107 Subsequently, it extended the exclusionary rule to apply
not only to the illegal seizure of private papers, but also to con-
traband illegally seized from a defendant's home. 08 Thus, the
rules set forth in Boyd and Weeks became an established princi-
ple requiring the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at fed-
eral trials.
Most criminal trials, however, took place in state courts,
100. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
101. Id. at 638.
102. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
103. Id. at 398.
104. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
105. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
106. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
107. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
108. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (where a can of cocaine was
illegally seized).
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while the foregoing cases dealt only with the use of evidence in
federal court. In Wolf v. Colorado,09 however, the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule also applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
In Mapp v. Ohio,"' the Court went further and ruled that the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence is constitutionally required
in state and federal courts." 2 Even though other steps were
taken to punish offending police officers and to deter illegal
seizure, these courts could not admit the tainted evidence. Jus-
tice Clark stated explicitly that "the exclusionary rule is an es-
sential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." ' 8 In a concurring opinion, Justice Black asserted that
"when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a consti-
tutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually re-
quires the exclusionary rule.""14 Thus, the limitations on state
actions imposed by the fourteenth amendment were held to be
coextensive with the limitations placed on the federal govern-
ment by the fourth amendment."'
Both prior to and following Mapp, the exclusionary rule has
been widely applied in a host of decisions by the United States
109. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court ruled that the security of a person's privacy
against unlawful intrusion by the police is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id. at 27 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Nevertheless, the
Court did not at that time mandate that states were always required to exclude evidence
seized unlawfully. They could, instead, use other equally effective remedies to deter ille-
gal seizures. Id. at 31. Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that evidence illegally
obtained by state officials could not be used in federal courts, thus overruling the so
called "silver platter" doctrine. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see also
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926).
110. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33.
111. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
112. Id. at 660.
113. Id. at 657. See also Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest
On A "Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 565 (1983).
114. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added). Earlier United States Supreme Court
decisions had already asserted that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated.
See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
115. Justice Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: the Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1379, (1983).
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Supreme Court, and, of course, by federal district and appellate
courts. For example, the exclusionary rule has been applied to
violations of the fifth amendment,116 sixth amendment,'1 7 to be-
havior that shook the conscience, " ' to confessions,"' and statu-
tory provisions. 20 The exclusionary rule covers not only the di-
rect products of illegal government conduct, but also applies to
evidence ultimately derived from illegal conduct, often referred
to as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."1 '' The Supreme Court
later reiterated in Mapp that the rule was a constitutional one
and held that "the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 122 Thus, in the many
years since the birth of the exclusionary rule, it became indispu-
table that "the exclusionary rule is now part of our legal cul-
ture,1 "2  and a fundamental part, at that.
V. The Retreat from the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule faced mounting criticism, particularly
in the years following the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio.12, It
116. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
117. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 588-93 (2d Cir. 1983).
118. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
119. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
120. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1939).
121. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The term "fruit of the poisonous tree" is derived from Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
122. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
123. See Stewart, supra note 115, at 1386.
124. See e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FED-
KRAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, Rep. No. GGD-79-45 (April 19, 1979); National Institute
of Justice, United States Department of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A
Study in California (1982); GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME
COURT, (1975); POLICE PowER AND INDxvrDuAL FREEDOM: THE QUEST FOR BALANCE, 75-222
(C. Sowle ed. 1962); SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. Rav. 1
(1964); Canon, Is The Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1973-74); Inbow, Restrictions in the
Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. Rav. 77 (1957); Oaks, Studying the
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has been argued that "a decision to exclude probative evidence
with the result that a criminal goes free to prey upon the public
should shock the judicial conscience even more than admitting
the evidence,"12 5 and that "the conscience of the Court ought to
be at least equally shaken by the idea of turning a criminal loose
on society." ' 6
Professor Dallin N. Oaks, for example, examined twelve
days of proceedings of the courts.1 1 7 He found that motions to
suppress evidence were filed in thirty-four percent of the narcot-
ics prosecutions and in thirty-six percent of concealed weapons
prosecutions. Ninety-seven percent of the narcotics motions and
two-thirds of the concealed weapons motions were granted. In
every instance in which the motion was successful, the case was
subsequently dismissed because prosecution was not possible
where the illegal object could not have been introduced into evi-
dence. The result of the exclusionary rule was that one-third of
the narcotics cases and one-fourth of the weapons cases were
never tried."'8
The study by the National Institute of Justice 12 9 disclosed
that numerous cases involving illegal searches were excluded
from prosecution even before they reached the stage of a sup-
pression hearing. In California, between 1976 and 1979, nearly
three thousand felony drug cases were not prosecuted because of
the exclusionary rule.130 Nearly half of defendants in those cases
who were not prosecuted in 1976 and 1977 because of the exclu-
sionary rule problems were arrested again within two years on
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Spiotto, The
Search and Seizure Problem - Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the
U.S. Exclusionary Rule, J. POLICE ScI. & AD 36 (1973); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment
With The Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Wright, Must The Criminal Go
Free If The Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736 (1972); Law Reform Commission
of Canada, Report on Evidence 15-45 (1975); Rosenblatt, A Legal House of Cards,
HApwE's, July, 1977 at 18; WALL ST. J., April 3, 1991 at A21, col.3, March 28, 1991 at
A14, col. 1, July 12, 1971 at 8, col. 1.
125. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
126. McGuigan, An Interview With Judge Robert H. Bork, JUD. NOTICE 1, 1-6 (June
1, 1986).
127. See Oaks, supra note 124, at 665.
128. Id.
129. See National Institute of Justice, supra note 124.
130. Id. at 1, 2, 12, 13, 18.
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new charges.' Moreover, it has been suggested that prosecutors
often entered into lenient plea bargains rather than run the risk
that key evidence would be suppressed. 132
Additionally, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out, "[t]his
evidentiary rule is unique to American jurisprudence. Although
the English and Canadian legal systems are highly regarded,
neither has adopted our rule."' 33 As Justice Frankfurter had
pointed out, "[o]f 10 jurisdictions within the United Kingdom
and the British Commonwealth of Nations which have passed on
the question, none has held evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure inadmissible."'' I 4 The argument that the United
States is alone among all the other countries of the civilized
world in applying an exclusionary rule was bolstered by the fact
that the rule was not employed by United States courts until
approximately one hundred years after the adoption of the
fourth amendment.
Moreover, it was argued that the rule has not, in fact, de-
terred illegal conduct.' 5 Oaks, in his study, concluded that "[a]s
a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by
the police, the exclusionary rule is a failure .... The harshest
criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective."'3 0 Spiotto, who
made a comparative study of the exclusionary rule with an alter-
native rule existing in Canada, concluded that:
[e]mpirical study (of narcotics and weapons cases) indicates that,
over a 20-year period in Chicago, the proportion of cases in which
there were motions to suppress evidence allegedly obtained ille-
gally increased significantly. This is the opposite result of what
would be expected if the rule had been efficacious in deterring
police misconduct. 3 7
The rule has also been criticized as hampering gun control
131. Id. at 2, 10, 14-18.
132. Id. at 1-2.
133. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Mitchell, The Supreme Court of
Canada on the Exclusion of Evidence in Criminal Cases under Section 24 of the Char-
ter, 30 CiuM. L.Q. 165 (1987).
134. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949).
135. See Oaks, supra note 124, at 755.
136. Id. at 755.
137. See Spiotto, supra note 124, at 36-37.
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by permitting criminals to carry guns free of the fear of being
stopped on the street unless they do something drastically
suspicious."8,
Another drawback of the rule is that it does not discrimi-
nate between the degree of culpability of the police officer and
the degree of harm to the victim of the illegal search. Similarly,
it does not make adequate distinction between minor offenses
and more serious crimes. 3 9 Moreover, it allegedly encourages po-
licemen to perjure themselves regarding a search in order to pre-
vent the evidence from being barred. 40 It is even claimed that it
encourages corrupt policemen to stage phony raids on criminal
establishments in deliberate violation of the fourth amendment
and other constitutional provisions. This would be done in order
to immunize the persons and premises raided, while giving the
officers the. appearance of being actively engaged in a crusade
against crime." '
These criticisms began to be reflected in court opinions.
"The disparity in particular cases between the error committed
by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant
by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportional-
ity that is essential to the concept of justice."' 42 The rule may
"generat[e] disrespect for the law and [the] administration of
justice.""" It is a "drastic and socially costly course."'' As Jus-
tice Cardozo noted, "the criminal is to go free because the con-
stable has blundered."'" Justice Cardozo further stated that,
"[a] room is searched against the law, and the body of a mur-
dered man is found .... The privacy of the home has been in-
fringed, and the murderer goes free.' 46 Justice Powell
expounded:
[tihe costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on
138. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA-
TuRE 214, 224 (1978).
139. Id. at 226.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 138.
142. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
143. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
144. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984).
145. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
146. Id. at 23-24, 150 N.E. at 588.
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direct review are well known: ... the physical evidence sought to
be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative in-
formation bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant ....
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and
often frees the guilty.147
It was also felt that the rule resulted in justice being applied
in an uneven manner. The Court barred illegally seized evidence,
while permitting trial of defendants who had been illegally kid-
napped and brought to trial.148
The Supreme Court began a withdrawal. 14 9 Already in 1920,
the Court had held that illegally discovered evidence could be
admitted if it was also discovered from an independent legal
source, 150 or the connection between the illegal conduct and the
challenged evidence was "so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."'
The retreat from the exclusionary rule was plainly stated in
the words of Justice Harlan:
From the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is
apparent that the law of search and seizure is due for an over-
hauling.... I would begin this process of re-evaluation by over-
ruling Mapp v. Ohio and Ker v. California .... In combination
Mapp and Ker have been primarily responsible for bringing
about serious distortions and incongruities in this field of consti-
tutional law. 52
The withdrawal from the exclusionary rule as first enunci-
ated has been long and almost steady. In 1965, the Supreme
Court, weighing the social costs of applying the rule against its
social benefits, held that the exclusionary rule would not be ap-
plied retrospectively in cases finally decided before Mapp.15 3
147. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.
148. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). The proposed Federal Criminal Code backed by the
Bush Administration would also restrict application of the exclusionary rule.
149. See JoNEs, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 251 (1981); Nelson, The Paradox
of the Exclusionary Rule, 96 THE PUB. INTEREST 117 (Summer 1989).
150. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
151. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); see also Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
152. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (citations omitted).
153. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
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In Cady v. Dombrowski,15 4 the Court refused to allow the
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence, such as blood stained arti-
cles in the trunk of a car, which had been used to convict Dom-
browski of first degree murder. 56 This holding seemed to di-
rectly contradict the Court's prior holding in Preston v. United
States.56 The Court's decision seemed to be motivated by its
preference to have a brutal murderer imprisoned, rather than to
reprimand the police for searching the car in which the evidence
was found.
In 1974, the Supreme Court began to erode the constitu-
tional basis for the exclusionary rule by holding, "[in sum, the
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.' 57 If
judges, not the Constitution, had created the rule, then judges
could change it. The Court, accordingly, held that the use of ille-
gally seized evidence constituted "no new Fourth Amendment
wrong"" and that the rule should be "restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."'16
In 1984, the Court again struck at the claimed constitu-
tional basis of the rule and held that the rule is "a judicially
created remedy... rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved."' 60 Similarly, the Supreme Court held that
the rule did not apply to grand jury proceedings.'
Subsequently, the Court held that the rule could not be
154. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
155. Id. at 437-38.
156. 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (holding a warrantless seach of an automobile to be uncon-
stitutional and that items seized therein were inadmissible evidence).
157. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
158. Id. at 354.
159. Id. at 348.
160. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that the exclusion-
ary rule is constitutionally required. Otherwise, it could not be imposed upon the states
via the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 940. Some hold that while it is not a constitutional
right, it is a constitutional remedy and that the constitution requires application of the
exclusionary rule, particularly, if there are no other adequate means to ensure that the
fourth amendment is obeyed. See Stewart, supra note 115, at 1384; Kamisar, supra note
113.
161. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351-52.
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used to challenge a state conviction where the state provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment
claim.162 The Court eventually held that the rule did not apply
to civil proceedings163 and the Court even began applying addi-
tional restrictions on the rule to criminal trials.' "4 In 1980, for
example, it held that the rule would not apply for the purpose of
impeachment in a criminal trial."6 5 The Supreme Court even
permitted the testimony of a witness whose identity was discov-
ered in an unconstitutional search. "'
The Court went still further. In United States v. Payner,16 7
it applied a broad "no standing" rule to deny application of the
exclusionary rule.1 8' Accordingly, the evidence in Payner, al-
though illegally gathered, could be used to convict.169 Although
the Court had previously applied a "no standing" rule to limit
application of the exclusionary rule,7 ° it had granted standing
very liberally. "7' Now, the defendants had to prove both a pos-
sessory interest in the evidence seized and a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in order to have standing. The Court reached this
162. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). Some have viewed this decision as
an important portent of the Supreme Court's gradual abandonment of the exclusionary
rule. "The course of the future was unveiled in Powell. The Supreme Court plans to
abandon the contents of the exclusionary rule, seriatum, [one by one] .. ).." D. JoNEs,
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 233, 260 (1981).
163. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984); see also United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976); JONES, supra note 162, at 260 ("Revealed one more link
in its apparent plan to abandon the exclusionary rule: in upholding a seizure of evidence
pursuant to a defective warrant").
164. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
165. Id.
166. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). A police officer had entered a
florist shop to chat with the salesclerk. Upon noticing an envelope on the cash register
with some money protruding, he opened the envelope and observed that it contained
betting slips as well. The policeman notified federal gambling authorities. Eventually the
owner of the store, Mr. Ceccolini, was convicted. The Supreme Court ruled that the tes-
timony of the salesclerk should not be suppressed since this, "could not have the slight-
est deterrent effect" on other policemen. Id. at 280.
167. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
168. In Payner, the Internal Revenue Service caused a bank officer to be lured into
an apartment where his briefcase was rifled, and the contents later used to convict a
depositor of falsifying his tax return. Id. at 730. The Court held that since the bank
officer had committed no crime, application of the exclusionary rule would not benefit
him. Id. at 735.
169. Id. at 735.
170. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
171. Nelson, supra note 149, at 125.
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conclusion even though the lower court had found that "the
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully
conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
19172in order to obtain evidence against third parties ....
Another important step in the retreat was the Supreme
Court's decision in Nix v. Williams' 73 which established a new
exception to the exclusionary rule. "If the prosecution can estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ul-
timately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means . . . then the deterrence rational has so little basis that
the evidence should be received."' 7 " This meant that once a law-
ful search was started with a high probability of success, the
Court would excuse violation of constitutional requirements.
Here, too, the Court appeared to be motivated by its desire to
admit the challenged evidence - the corpse of a ten-year old
girl murdered by the defendant. Justice Stevens stated in his
concurring opinion, "there can be no denying that the character
of the crime may have an impact on the decisional process. '1 75
At the same time, the Court took another step backwards
and fashioned a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
After listing the various ways in which the exclusionary rule
frustrates justice, particularly because of the criminals freed by
the rule, the Court commented that "the small percentages with
which they deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are
released because the cases against them were based in part on
illegal searches or seizures.' 1 76 The Court, accordingly, permit-
ted the use of illegally seized evidence, although based upon an
invalid search warrant where the police were objectively reason-
able in relying on the validity of the warrant.
The good faith exception even permitted the use of illegally
secured evidence where the warrant did not apply to the article
seized and neither the judge nor the policemen had actually read
the warrant.177 The Court nevertheless held that police reliance
172. Payner, 447 U.S. at 730.
173. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
174. Id. at 444.
175. Id. at 451.
176. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
177. Id. at 907 n.6.
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on the warrant was "objectively reasonable."""8 The "good faith"
doctrine was later applied to permit use of illegally seized evi-
dence which had been obtained in reliance upon a statute which
authorized warrantless searches, even though the statute was
later found to be unconstitutional.17
Only last year, in New York v. Harris,1 80 the Court held that
the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence obtained by
policemen who unlawfully entered a defendant's home without a
warrant in violation of Payton v. New York."81 The Court fur-
ther held, based on the rationale of Ceccolini, "we have declined
to adopt a 'per se or "but for" rule' that would make inadmissi-
ble any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony,
which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that
began with an illegal arrest."182
The Court has also recently retreated from the long-held
view that admission of a coerced confession into evidence vio-
lated due process requiring automatic reversal of conviction."'
The Court held use of the coerced confession at trial could be
regarded as harmless error.'84 Moreover, the Supreme Court re-
cently overturned two prior decisions and narrowed the exclu-
sionary rule further, holding that the rule did not exclude evi-
178. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984).
179. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 34, 349-55 (1987).
180. 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990).
181. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Harris, the policeman arrested the defendant illegally,
and took him to the police station where he admitted that he had killed someone. The
Court held that his station house admission was admissible on the ground that the state-
ment, while the product of an arrest and custody which was illegal, "was not the fruit of
the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than some place else." Harris, 110
S. Ct. at 1644. The Court emphasized that "the penalties visited upon the government,
and in turn upon the public, because its officers have violated the law must bear some
relation to the purposes which the law is to serve." Id. at 1642-43 (quoting United States.
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978)).
182. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting United States. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
276 (1978)). For a detailed examination of "exceptions" to the exclusionary rule allowed
by the Supreme Court, see Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evi-
dence, And The Emasculation Of The Fourth Amendment, 55 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1221
(1987).
183. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). As indicated in the dissenting
opinion, it had generally been assumed as axiomatic that use of a coerced confession in a
criminal trial was ground for automatic reversal of conviction based upon decisions like
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1258.
184. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1256.
1991]
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
dence seized in warrantless searches of automobiles and
containers in such automobiles. The evidence could be admitted
where there was probable cause to believe that the containers in
the automobile held contraband or evidence. 18s
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has, without ad-
mitting it, functionally narrowed and severely modified the ex-
clusionary rule.'86 It has done this even though the doctrine had
become an integral and fundamental part of United States con-
stitutional law.
Which, if either, paradigm has the Supreme Court followed:
Jewish law, the approach of the medieval non-Jewish jurists, or
neither? On the one hand, the Supreme Court has not admitted
that it was backtracking and functionally changing the law. Like
the medieval jurists, who purported to continue to apply estab-
lished doctrine and refused to change the law, the Supreme
Court adheres outwardly to the pose that it, too, continues to
apply the same exclusionary rule. It merely defines and adds de-
tails to the scope of the rule. In fact, however, as detailed above,
it is obvious that a very substantial backtracking has occurred.
Unlike the medieval Jewish jurists, the Court masks its re-
treat from the exclusionary rule and refuses to admit that it is
gradually abandoning the rule - at least to a significant extent.
Here, too, this masking by the Court of its actions follows a well-
established practice in American law.5 7
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the Supreme
Court, unlike its medieval counterparts, refuses to continue to
blindly apply a rule which it feels to be unjust and contrary to
the interests of society. Instead, in what seems to be somewhat
of a middle ground between the two models of medieval non-
185. California v. Aceveto, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
186. This is not to say that the retreat has proceeded in a straight line. There have
been numerous zigs and zags. See, e.g., the recent decision in Minnick v. Mississippi, 111
S. Ct. 486 (1990) (excluding a confession made after a prisoner's lawyer had departed).
187. See M. RmsMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING
LAW, 189 (1988). The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
may be a good example. The Court purported to base its decision, striking down state
anti-abortion statutes, on the right to privacy. In fact, based upon the Court's statements
in the decision, and from the logical flaws in the decision, it is arguable, that the Court
was motivated by entirely different factors, and desired, essentially, to mediate between
conflicting claims of various groups in the United States. See RalsMAN & SCHREIBER,
supra, at 196.
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Jewish and Jewish jurists, the Court purports to adhere to the
exclusionary rule, while, in practice, it modifies it. 8 8 The Court
is extremely sensitive to the need for protection from the dan-
gers of overreaching by government officials. Accordingly, it
seeks to shape the law to meet the changing needs of society by
sheltering it from criminals, while limiting governmental
intrusions.
In sum, the Supreme Court appears to follow neither of the
medieval paradigms dealing with an unsatisfactory fundamental
law, but strikes out in a direction of its own. Its approach, how-
ever, seems closer to that of the medieval non-Jewish jurists who
also circumvented the law in practice for what they believed to
be in the better interests of society, but refused to admit it.
VI. Afterword
This article has focused on torture and coerced confessions
in the Middle Ages, and on the exclusionary rule, but not tor-
ture, in thi United States today. It is not meant to imply, how-
ever, that forms of torture and coerced confessions are not a
contemporary phenomenon as well, and that these were confined
to the medieval and ancient world. On the contrary, apart from
the brutal tortures that are practiced in most countries of the
world today, where dictators or oligarchies rule, there are dis-
turbing echoes of the medieval practices in civilized western
countries and even in the United States.'
In many states in Western Europe that use the inquisitorial
system, persons may still be arrested and incarcerated for long
periods of time for interrogation. Extended confinement, often
under conditions of privation, can shatter resolve and induce
confessions, sometimes under the hope of better treatment or of
being dealt with leniently.
In the United States, too, as has been persuasively ar-
188. For the long legal tradition that the law should be made to appear stable and
unchanging, see J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, 48 (1936). It is motivated by
many factors, including the desire to promote the illusion that the law is stable in order
to avoid upsetting the public and making it apprehensive, thus inhibiting commerce be-
cause of fears of constantly shifting rules.
189. For discussion of the practice of torture today and historical contexts, see THE
DEATH PENALTY AND TORTURE (F. Bockle and J. Pohol ed. 1979).
1991]
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
gued, 190 plea bargaining may compel even an innocent defendant
to confess to a lesser crime in order to avoid the possibility of
conviction of a much more serious crime which would result in
long imprisonment and stigmatization.191 So too, the practice of
granting immunity or promising a lenient sentence to a defend-
ant in order to induce him to implicate bigger fish may coerce
the defendant to confess falsely and incriminate others, in order
to escape more severe sanctions. More recently, RICO prosecu-
tions, with their threat of draconian measures before trial (such
as seizure of assets of financial institutions, which would compel
them to cease operations and face complete financial destruc-
tion), may have compelled confessions by those who would oth-
erwise contest the criminality of their acts.1 92 Moreover, the use
of coerced confessions at trial may now be regarded as harmless
error and no longer requires automatic reversal of conviction.193
Thus, confessions are still being coerced today, even though
eyewitness testimony is no longer required, circumstantial evi-
dence may be used, and we do not have an inquisitorial system
of trials. The motive is the very same one that contributed to
torture in the Middle Ages - the fear that trial without the
forced confession would not result in a conviction. Since we are
civilized, however, our methods have improved. They are more
genteel and sophisticated than those of our medieval forebears.
But do they differ in moral quality?
We continue to carry baggage from our past which merits
close examination and introspection.
190. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 50
(1968); Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, supra note 1.
191. Alschuler, supra note 190. Alschuler reports the striking example of a defend-
ant charged with kidnapping and forcible rape. His attorney was convinced that he was
innocent and would be acquitted at trial. The defendant, nevertheless agreed to a guilty
plea of simple battery, stating "I can't take the chance with a trial." Id. at 61.
192. See, e.g., Crovitz, Prosecutors Must Beware 'Cooperation' as Perjury, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 27, 1991, at A15, col. 3 (regarding problems with, and unreliability of, RICO -
induced testimony in such well known prosecutions as the Wedtech, Michael Milken,
Princeton/Newport, and other similar cases).
193. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
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